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Abstract 
 
This study focuses on whether new management uses impression management to 
influence the presentation of performance in the firm’s annual reports surrounding a 
changeover in CEO. The study considers the use or non-use of graphs for presenting 
information as well as distortions in the graphs. 
 
Overall there is some evidence for impression management, but it is not strong. Thus 
impression management as implemented through graphs does not appear to be used 
as widely in New Zealand as in other jurisdictions where it has been studied.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Management’s performance is largely evaluated and remunerated on the performance of the 
firm which is displayed in the annual reports.  This provides management with a motivation 
to influence the content and prominence of the information presented in the annual reports. 
One tactic new management may choose is to blame initial poor performance on its 
predecessor and then take credit for subsequent good performance. Godfrey et al. (2003) 
argue that new CEOs have incentives to increase their welfare by establishing tenure. This is 
because managers receive a substantial portion of their wealth in the form of human capital 
(Fama, 1980). That is, labour markets effectively award managers with increases in 
remuneration and continuity of employment based on the perceived success or failure of the 
firms they are managing (Godfrey et al, 2003). Hence, new CEOs strive to create an 
impression that they are performing better than their predecessor so as to quickly secure 
tenure. Also, most compensation contracts are tied to performance so better performance 
and/or the impression of better performance may be expected to lead to increased 
compensation.    
 
This study examines one device, graphs, that management can use to influence perceptions 
surrounding a change in top management.  It finds some support that graphs are used to 
influence perceptions, but the overall results are mixed.  
 
1.2 Outline of the rest of the paper 
This research project is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework 
and literature review. Section 3 follows and describes the research methodology including the 
development of the hypotheses and sample selection. In section 4, the results are discussed 
while in section 5 the research project is concluded. And finally in section 6 a reference list is 
provided.   
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2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
An agency relationship is defined as a contractual agreement between two parties 
conventionally called the principal and the agent. The principal engages the agent to perform 
some service on the principal’s behalf and delegates some decision making authority to the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling argue that if both parties (the 
principal and agent) are utility maximisers then it is likely that the agent may not always act 
in the best interests of the principal. Hence the principal incurs monitoring and bonding costs 
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. Given that both the principal and the 
agent are utility maximisers, it is generally impossible to assume that the agent will always 
make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. The divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and the optimum decisions for the principal gives rise to a reduction in the value of 
the welfare of the principal. This reduction is referred to as the residual loss. The sum total of 
the costs incurred by the principal is referred to as the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 
Two of the many problems that may arise from the agency relationship in most business 
settings include adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the existence of the 
condition where the principal is not able to ascertain if the agent accurately represents his/her 
ability to carry out the work for which compensation is made and moral hazard is the 
condition under which the principal is not sure whether the agent has given the utmost to the 
business (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) since both principals and agents (CEO’s) are 
utility maximisers there exists motivation for agents to engage in some decisions that are sub-
optimal for the principals. This suggests that CEO’s at times may have incentives to engage 
in self-interested wealth maximising behaviour at the expense of principals’ (shareholders). 
Thus one can argue that within this framework, CEO’s may be motivated to manage both the 
accounting numbers and the way the numbers are represented. 
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Financial reporting researchers have recognised that there exist strong economic and social 
incentives for managements to display self interested behaviour in annual reports. Research 
has found that some managements make discretionary financial reporting choices in the areas 
of measurement, disclosure and presentation (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993, Beattie and 
Jones, 2000). The current study seeks to determine if new managers frequently choose to use 
graphs as a means for displaying financial results in a self-interested manner.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The financial disclosure literature suggests  
that managers, shareholders, auditors and standard setters all derive benefits from 
selective financial misrepresentation (Revsine, 1991, p.17). 
 
The literature emphasises that management has incentives for ‘selective financial 
representation’ (Revsine, 1991). One strand of the literature focuses on manipulation of 
accounting numbers by management.  This is referred to as earnings management. A second 
strand involves the use of non-accounting financial disclosures, and the third is impression 
management. The discussion that follows highlights the literature in earnings management.   
 
2.2.1 Earnings Management 
Revsine (1991) argues  
...that financial reporting is sometimes better characterised by the phrase ‘selective 
financial representation’ (p.17) 
And that  
This selective financial misrepresentation hypothesis cuts across both public and 
private sectors since participants in both sectors are motivated to support standards 
that selectively misrepresent economic reality when it suits their purpose (p.17) 
 Revsine illustrated the incentives that motivate various parties to misrepresent financial 
events. He reviewed and highlighted prior literature that provided support for his selective 
financial misrepresentation hypothesis. The parties that were considered were those that 
derived benefits from selective financial misrepresentation and included, managers, 
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shareholders, auditors and standard setters. The evidence gathered from the extensive 
literature review supported the hypothesis that observers (the authors of the literature 
considered) made inferences about the behaviour of the parties that were consistent with the 
misrepresentation hypothesis.  
 
Schipper (1989) provided a framework for thinking about the implications of research design 
choices in earnings management research. She defined the object of earnings management, 
explores the conditions that give rise to earnings management and provided a design for 
empirical tests for earnings management. She defined earnings management as “disclosure 
management” in the sense of purposeful intervention in the financial reporting process with 
the intention of obtaining some private gain. She argued that research findings related to 
earnings management so far are suggestive but not conclusive. 
 
Dechow et al (1995) evaluated alternative models to detect whether in certain circumstances 
management uses the financial reporting process to manage reported earnings.  They found 
that all models they considered appeared to produce reasonably well-specified tests for a 
random sample of event-years. However they found that the power of the test for earnings 
management was low for economically plausible magnitudes. Of all the models considered 
they found that the modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) provided the 
most powerful test of earnings management. The findings also provided three major 
implications for research on earnings management. First was that regardless of the model 
used to detect earnings management, the power of the tests were relatively low for earnings 
management of economically plausible magnitudes. Secondly subtle cases of earnings 
management (such as one percent of total assests), require sample sizes of several hundred 
firms to provide a reasonable chance of detection. And finally, further research needs to be 
carried out to develop models that generate better specified and more powerful tests to detect 
earnings management. 
 
2.2.2 Non-accounting Financial Disclosure 
 
Another strand of the financial disclosure literature focuses on the inclusion of disclosures 
other than the underlying accounting numbers. Gibbins et al. (1990) theorised that firms  
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develop a stable, two dimensional internal preference for managing disclosures. The first 
dimension being the uncritical acceptance of the norms while the second being the propensity 
to seek firm-specific advantage in how disclosures are being made and developed. Norms are 
defined to be the informal or formal rules, procedures, and standards believed by the 
managers to apply to a particular disclosure issue. Twenty interviews were conducted: 
1) To develop a vocabulary of constructs and variables to describe disclosure processes 
and 
2) To identify relations amongst these constructs and variables.  
 
They found five variables that influenced the set of disclosure outputs: 
1) The firms disclosure position 
2) The antecedents of the firms’ disclosure position 
3) The specific disclosure issues faced by the firm 
4) External consultants and advisors 
5) Structure 
 
The findings also suggested that the disclosure position (one of the variables that influences 
disclosure outputs), was influenced by several internal organisational factors such as the 
firm’s history, its financial performance, and its CEO. Their theory suggested that there exists 
a relation between the changes in the above mentioned internal factors and changes in the 
firm’s disclosure position. For example a change in CEO may precipitate a change in a firm’s 
disclosure position. 
 
2.2.3 Impression Management   
 
The third strand of the financial disclosure literature is impression management which is the 
focus of this study. Impression management refers to management’s attempts to manipulate 
the interpretation of disclosed data. The most popular form of impression management is the 
use/abuse of graphs. With impression management, firms use graphs contained within annual 
reports to present self-interested representations of corporate performance. This approach, 
serves to legitimise the actions of management and to convince the owners/shareholders that 
the company is being run competently and efficiently. 
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Managements of firms regularly use graphs to convey information to shareholders. 
Impression management with graphs occurs when managements use financial graphs in 
annual reports to display selected information and present information in ways to convey a 
favourable portrait of management in the annual report. Beattie et al. 1999 suggests that 
Impression management using financial graphs occurs in three principal ways. First, 
management can decide, on an annual basis, whether or not to use graphs at all and, 
if used, which specific variables to graph. Second, graphical construction techniques 
can be used to manipulate the message conveyed (e.g. non-zero axes or altering a 
graph’s shape). Finally, graph design features can be used to enhance the message 
conveyed by the accounting numbers in an unwarranted way (e.g. by unduly 
emphasising the colour of the last specifier (column) in a sequence). (Beattie and 
Jones, 1999. p.47)   
 
One of the first studies on impression management was done by Johnson, Rice and 
Roemmich (1980) which considered the issue of distortions in graph construction. Johnson et 
al. (1980), examined 50 annual reports randomly selected from US Fortune 500 companies. 
These firms included 423 graphs in their annual reports over the period 1977-1978.  Their 
findings suggested that at least one graph was incorrectly constructed in 42% of the annual 
reports and 29.5% of all graphs reviewed were constructed incorrectly.  
 
Taylor and Anderson (1986) provide guidelines for the accountant on the construction of 
graphs. They suggest that graphs should be consistent with the financial data so as not to 
mislead users or violate certain auditing standards. One such suggestion was that the 
percentage change in graphs should reflect the percentage change in the underlying financial 
data. When this condition is not met, they said the graph suffers from distortion. 
 
Steinbart (1989) subsequently studied the annual reports of 319 companies from US Fortune 
500 companies. Steinbart (1989) examined both distortion and selectivity in annual reports. 
His findings suggested that distortion in the graphs of three key financial variables (sales, 
profits and dividends) exaggerated the magnitude of change by about 11%. He found an 
absolute distortion of greater than 10% in approximately 26% of the graphs of key financial 
variables. He also found evidence of selectivity in the use of graphs. His findings suggested 
that “good news” companies were more likely (74% compared to 53%) to include graphs of 
key financial variables in annual reports while “bad news” companies were more likely to 
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include distorted graphs. He defined “good news” companies as those having an increase in 
the net profit for the relevant year while “bad news” companies were those that had a decline 
in net profit. 
 
Beattie and Jones (1992), examined the use and abuse of graphs in the UK. They used the 
1989 annual reports for 240 UK listed companies and tested hypotheses relating to selectivity 
and distortion in the use of graphs. Selectivity refers to management systematically choosing 
to include or exclude graphs based on their relation to the firm’s performance. Similar to 
Godfrey et al (2003) “favourable selectivity” refers to inclusion of graphs where the 
performance trend on the financial variable is positive and deletion of graphs where the 
performance trend on the latter is negative. The opposite applies to unfavourable selectivity. 
 
Distortion on the other hand is concerned with the extent to which graphs of financial 
variables accurately reflect the underlying data.  
 
Beattie and Jones (1992) found that: 
• Graphs were widely used; 
• Companies with “good” performance were significantly more likely to use graphs; 
• Measurement distortion was significant; and 
• The effect of measurement distortion was generally to portray the company’s 
performance more favourably (p. 301) 
 
Beattie and Jones (1999) extended the understanding of graphical reporting practices in the 
Australian accounting environment. Their study posed four objectives. 
1) Establish the nature of graphs used in the annual reports of Australian companies, 
2) Document and analyse cases where the principle of representational neutrality is 
violated with regards to selectivity, measurement distortion, orientation distortion and 
presentational aspects of graph use, 
3) Determine whether differences exist in graphical reporting practices between the 
industrial and service, extractive, financial services and diversified sectors, and 
4) Compare and contrast the results of this study with those of other Australian, USA, UK 
and Canadian practices. 
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The 1991 corporate annual reports for eighty-nine of the top hundred Australian listed 
companies were sampled. The sample was then categorised into four broad industrial 
categories that included industrial or service, extractive, financial services and diversified 
companies. 
 
The results revealed that: 
1) Eighty-nine percent of Australian companies graphed at least one performance or non-
performance variable and that seventy-two percent of companies graphed at least one 
of the four generic key financial variables (sales, profit, earnings per share, dividends 
per share). 
2) Significant associations were found between the inclusion of at least one Key Financial 
Variable (KFV) and the five-year profit and sales trend. Measurement distortion was 
also evident with 34.2% of the graphs containing material distortions. Profit and 
dividends per share were more than twice as likely to be favourably rather than 
unfavourably presented.  
3) The findings reinforced the results of earlier studies. In United Sates of America (USA) 
and United Kingdom (UK) studies, strong evidence of selectivity was found. These 
results were consistent with this Australian study. However, selectivity and the level 
of mean measurement distortion were lower for Australian companies compared to 
the USA and UK.   
 
Beattie and Jones (2000) investigated whether changes in companies’ use of key financial 
graphs, at both the aggregate and individual company level are associated with corporate 
performance. A sample of 137 companies from the top 500 listed UK companies as at 31, 
March 1989 were selected. The annual reports for five years historical data (1988-1992) were 
analysed for each company. 
 
The hypotheses tested were: 
1) The aggregate incidence of KFV graphs over time are related positively to aggregate 
corporate performance, and 
2) Individual company’s changes in KFV graph use are related positively to the individual 
company’s performance 
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The evidence supporting the manipulation hypothesis in relation to graph selectivity was very 
strong. The results suggested that income and EPS were the dominant determinants. Overall 
results clearly showed that companies were significantly more likely to include graphs in 
their annual reports when income and EPS increased.   
 
Marther, Ramsay and Sherry (1996), studied the use and representational faithfulness of 
graphs in the 1991 and 1992 annual reports of 143 Australian listed companies and in the 
1991 annual reports of 44 not-for-profit entities. Their findings were that:  
• For the sample of 143 companies, no significant relation between the use of key 
financial variables in graphs and company performance was found . However when 
the sample was partitioned  according to market capitalisation, smaller companies 
(those ranked 51-150), were significantly more likely to include graphs of key 
financial variables when their performance improved. 
• Similarly no significant overall relationship between distortion and company 
performance was found. 
• The not-for profit entities had very few graphs of key financial variables other than 
turnover which was also found to be insignificant. 
• For not-for-profit entities, it was found that 51% of graphs were distorted by more 
than 5%, with 32% exaggerated and 19% understated.  
 
Mather, Ramsay and Steen (2000) further examined the use and representational faithfulness 
of graphs used by Australian companies engaged in an initial public offering (IPO) of shares. 
They selected a total of 484 Australian IPO prospectuses and tested for selectivity and 
distortion in the graphs included in the prospectuses. The overall findings suggested that there 
was significant evidence of selectivity. However for post -1991 IPO’s there was no such 
evidence. The change reflects the introduction of institutional and regulatory rules that 
reduced managements’ discretion in the choice of graphs. However there was no significant 
evidence for distortion in graphs. 
 
Arunachalam, Pei and Steinbart (2002) reported the results of three experiments that 
investigated the effects of improperly designed graphs on decision making. The results 
indicated that the decision makers’ choices were indeed influenced by improperly designed 
graphs, even though such graphs also presented precise, accurate numeric data.  
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2.2.4 CEO Turnover and Financial Reporting 
 
The impact of a change in top management of a firm has attracted research attention 
regarding both earnings management and impression management. Pourciau (1993) 
investigated the relation between top executive changes and discretionary accounting choices. 
A total of 73 companies that had executive changes were sampled. The results suggested that 
incoming executives record accruals and write-offs in a way that decreases earnings in the 
year of the executive change and increases earnings in the year after the change. However it 
was recognised that the research design did not account for the reported changes in earnings 
as a result of normal company performance since no control was established.   
 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examined and documented the behaviour of several 
financial variables surrounding CEO change and considered the implications of simultaneous 
changes among the variables. Their primary objective was to estimate the extent to which 
changes in discretionary variables were explained by poor economic performance rather than 
direct managerial discretion. The two discretionary decisions considered were: 
1) Managerial horizon problem whereby departing CEOs in good performance firms, 
having knowledge of their pending retirement commit to investment decisions that 
further enhance short-term performance. 
2) In firms having deteriorating economic health, the outgoing CEOs cover up the extent 
of their poor performance while the incoming CEOs then take a “big bath”. 
 
A sample of 1063 CEO departures during the period 1971 – 1989 from Forbes 500 firms was 
considered. Eight financial variables were selected to describe the behaviour of CEOs 
surrounding their departures. The Eight variables considered were: 
1) Research and Development 
2) Advertising 
3) Capital Expenditures 
4) Accounting Accruals 
5) Earnings 
6) Sales 
7) Assets 
8) Stock Prices 
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The evidence presented suggested that firm performance and managers’ exercise of discretion 
over financial variables were inextricably linked. They found that all financial variables fall 
surrounding CEO turnover. The findings suggested that generally poor performance is 
correlated with both CEO turnover and changes in discretionary variables. However there 
was little evidence to support the hypothesis that outgoing CEOs exercise their discretion 
over accounting or investment variables to increase their earnings based compensation in the 
year prior to, or in the year of their departure. But some evidence existed consistent with the 
hypothesis that the incoming CEOs take a big bath. 
 
Across the Tasman, Wells (2002) investigated the extent of opportunistic earnings 
management in the periods surrounding CEO changes for Australian firms. A total of 100 of 
the largest Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed firms were identified from 30 June 1984 
to 30 June 1994. Firms having CEO changes during the period were identified and a final 
sample of 65 CEO changes reported by 42 firms was selected. The evidence gathered 
provided little empirical support for CEOs undertaking upward earnings management either 
before or after a CEO change. However there was evidence to suggest that incoming CEOs 
take an ‘earnings bath’ in the year of the CEO change. 
 
Godfrey, Marther and Ramsay (2003), tested a sample of 63 Australian firms for earnings and 
impression management surrounding a change in CEO. They developed hypotheses on the 
view that new CEOs have incentives to engage in earnings and impression management such 
that they attribute poor performance to their predecessors and claim to be a better manager. 
Accordingly they tested their predictions that there will be unfavourable earnings and 
impression management in the year of CEO change and favourable earnings and impression 
management in the year following the CEO change.  
 
Their findings suggested that there is only limited evidence to suggest that incoming CEOs 
take a “big bath” while in the period following CEO change there existed evidence of 
favourable earnings management. 
 
For impression management relating to selectivity in the inclusion of graphs there was no 
support for the hypothesis that unfavourable selectivity occurred in the year of CEO change, 
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while there was strong support for the hypothesis that favourable selectivity existed in the 
year subsequent to the change of CEO. 
 
Impression management results relating to distortion revealed no evidence for favourable or 
unfavourable distortion of KFV in either the year of CEO change or the subsequent year.  
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3 Research Methodology 
 
The current study extends the Godfrey, et al. (2003) study to the New Zealand environment. 
Specifically it tests: 
Do CEOs engage in unfavourable impression management in the year of CEO change 
(year of change to the new CEO); and  
 
Do CEOs engage in favourable impression management in the year following a CEO 
change (first full year of the new CEO)? 
 
Impression management is measured using both: 
a. Selectivity, and 
b. Measurement distortion 
 
3.1 Selectivity 
 
Selectivity at its most fundamental level, involves the decision of whether or not to use 
graphs. If they are used, there may be further selectivity in the particular choice of the 
financial variables graphed (Beattie and Jones (1992), p. 291). 
In this study, the presence or absence of the graph of a key financial variable (KFV) was 
tested for an association with performance (Beattie and Jones, 1992, 1999; Mather et al., 
2000) across the sample for the years, t-1 (the last full year of the former CEO), t (the year of 
the change to a new CEO) and t+1 (the first full year for the new CEO). Consistent with 
earlier studies the key financial variables (KFV) examined were earnings, turnover, earnings 
per share and dividends per share. Selectivity was tested cumulatively and individually. The 
cumulative test considered all the KFVs combined, while individual tests  considered each 
KFV separately. 
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3.2 Distortion 
 
Measurement distortion is concerned with the extent to which the graphs of any of the four 
KFV deviate from a faithful representation of the underlying data. Tufte (1983) called this the 
“lie factor”. His “lie factor” was amended slightly in an accounting setting by Taylor and 
Anderson (1986) and Steinbart (1989) to produce a graph discrepancy index (GDI). The GDI 
was used in this study and was measured as follows:  
GDI = 100*((a/b)-1) 
Where  
a = percentage change depicted in the graph 
b = percentage change in the underlying data 
A GDI of 0% indicates that a graph represents the data faithfully while a GDI of anything 
greater than or less than 0% indicates positive or negative distortion.  
   
3.3 Development of Hypotheses 
 
The specific research questions addressed were: 
Do CEOs engage in unfavourable impression management in the year of change to a 
new CEO (year t) 
 
and 
 
Do CEOs engage in favourable impression management in the first full year following 
the CEO change (year t+1)? 
 
Based on prior literature and the associated research results it was expected that CEOs have 
incentives to engage in impression management. The predicted effect was that graphs are 
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used to imply poor or unfavourable performance by the predecessor CEO and subsequent 
improved performance by the new CEO. Hence it was expected that management would 
engage in unfavourable impression management in the annual reports in the year of CEO 
change (year t) and  favourable impression management in the annual reports for the first full 
year for the new CEO (year t+1). The mechanism examined for conveying favourable or 
unfavourable impressions was the use of selectivity and/or distortion when presenting 
information using graphs in annual reports.  
 
The nature of the impression management utilised was expected to be conditional on the 
firm’s performance. If there are increases in KFVs (referred to as good results) in the year of 
the change in CEO, the selectivity of the graphs were expected to display results 
“unfavourably” and the opposite would apply when the KFVs decrease (referred to as poor 
results). In the new CEO’s first full year after the change (year t+1), when the KFVs increase 
(good results), more graphs were expected to present the results “favourably”. The opposite 
was anticipated when there is a decline in the KFVs (poor results). 
 
Similarly, distortion was expected to enhance displays of poor performance in the year of 
CEO change (year t) and to understate good performance. But in the year following the 
change (the first full year for the new CEO (t+1)), it was expected that there would be a 
positive distortion of good news and an understatement of bad news. 
 
Hence the hypotheses to be tested were as follows: 
 
In the year of CEO change (year t): 
 
H1a:  Changes in the inclusion of Key Financial Variables graphed in the financial 
reports reflect unfavourable selectivity 
 
H1b: Key Financial Variables are graphically distorted to give an unfavourable 
portrayal of firm’s performance 
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In the year following the CEO change (year t+1): 
 
H2a: Changes in the inclusion of Key Financial Variables graphed in the financial 
reports reflect favourable selectivity 
 
H2b: Key Financial Variables are graphically distorted to give a favourable portrayal of 
firm’s performance 
 
3.4 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 
The data for this project was obtained from the annual reports of listed companies on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange. The annual reports are available electronically in the NZ Datex 
Database. At the time the data was gathered, the NZ Datex Database had electronic copies of 
annual reports of listed New Zealand companies for the period 1996 to 2007. This became the 
sample frame.  
 
The data collection involved firstly identifying corporations who had new CEO appointments 
during the 1997-2006 period.  The CEO changes/appointments were obtained from the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange Announcements. The Stock Exchange announcements were 
analysed to determine when the change was effected. The year of change became year t for 
that firm. Once the effective change period was determined, for those corporations that had a 
CEO change/appointment, the annual reports of the year the appointment took place referred 
to as (t), the year prior to the CEO change/appointment (t-1), and the year subsequent to the 
year of CEO change (t+1) were gathered. These annual reports were then analysed to gather 
selectivity and distortion measures. For selectivity these annual reports were examined to 
determine which of the KFVs graphs were displayed. The next step was to measure distortion 
in the graphs displayed by physically measuring the dimensions of the graphs and calculating 
the GDI for each.  
 
A total of 82 announcements of a change in CEO were identified during the period 1997 to 
2006. Of those announcements, two changes were excluded because the firms also changed 
their financial year dates, two changes were excluded because there were multiple intra-
period CEO changes during the period considered, and one change was excluded because of 
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missing data. Hence, the total number of changes considered for analysis was 77. Table 1 
provides the reconciliation of the sample. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Reconciliation of Sample 
 
Total Number of changes / new appointment of CEOs  82 
Less: Change not included due to change in financial year dates (2) 
Less: Change not included due to multiple intra-period changes of CEOs (2) 
Less: Change not included since one of the periods data not available (1) 
Total Changes included in sample 77 
  
18 
 
 
4 Results 
 
Unfortunately the small number of CEO changes observed in the study period precludes 
testing for statistical significance of the results obtained. Consequently only qualitative 
results are presented. 
 
4.1 Selectivity 
 
Table 2 reveals the frequency of graphs displaying key financial variables for the final full 
year of the former CEO (t-1), the year of change to a new CEO (t) and the first full year for 
the new CEO (t+1). The total number of graphs in year t+1 was 89 compared to 78 in t and 
76 in the year t-1. Thus the incidence of graphs increased for all three reporting periods.  
 
Table 2: The Frequency of Graphs Displaying Key Financial Variables 
 
The Key Variables 
Last Year of the 
Former CEO (t-1) 
Year of the 
Change to the 
New CEO (t) 
First Full Year of the 
New CEO (t+1) 
Earnings 32 29 35 
Turnover 17 21 28 
Earnings per share 15 14 13 
Dividends per share 12 14 13 
Total 76 78 89 
 
 
In order to determine whether there exists impression management using selectivity, the 
inclusion of graphs must be related to firm performance. Table 3 (Panels A and B) displays 
the frequency of graphs for the individual KFVs when the KFVs increase or decrease during 
years t-1, t, and t+1. 
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Table 3: Frequency of Graphs Displaying Key financial Variables when the Key Financial 
Variables Increase or Decrease  
 
Panel A 
The frequency of Graphs Displaying Key Financial Variables when the Key Financial 
Variables Increase 
The Key Variables 
Last Year of the 
Former CEO (t-1) 
Year of the 
Change to the 
New CEO (t) 
First Full Year of the 
New CEO (t+1) 
Earnings 23 17 25 
Turnover 15 15 19 
Earnings per share 8 11 4 
Dividends per share 10 11 10 
Total 56 54 58 
Panel B 
The frequency of Graphs Displaying Key Financial Variables when the Key Financial 
Variables Decrease 
The Key Variables 
Last Year of the 
Former CEO (t-1) 
Year of the 
Change to the 
New CEO (t) 
First Full Year of the 
New CEO (t+1) 
Earnings 9 12 10 
Turnover 2 6 9 
Earnings per share 7 3 9 
Dividends per share 2 3 3 
Total 20 24 31 
 
 
From a cumulative perspective, when there were increases in the KFVs, the total frequency of 
graphs for all KFVs in the years of change to a new CEO was 54 compared to 56 in the last 
year of the former CEO. Overall this suggests that good results have been “unfavourably” 
displayed.  When there were increases in the KFVs, the total frequency of graphs in the first 
full year for the new CEO was 58 compared to 54 in the year of change to new CEO 
implying that good results have been “favourably” displayed.  
  
20 
 
 
 
When there were decreases in the KFVs, there were more graphs (24 in total) in the year of 
the change to the new CEO when compared to the last full year of the former CEO (a total of 
20) suggesting that poor results  have been “favourably” displayed. However the total 
frequency of graphs in the first full year of the  new CEO was 31, which is 7 more when 
compared to the year of the change to the new CEO which is contrary to the hypothesis.  
 
The next section examines the presentations for the individual key financial variables. 
 
4.1.1 Earnings 
 
When earnings increased in the year of the change to a new CEO, the frequency of earnings 
graphs decreased from 23 to 17 and in the first full year of the new CEO, the frequency of 
graphs increased from 17 to 25. This is consistent with the hypothesis that good performance 
is de-emphasised in the year of change to the new CEO and emphasised in the first full year 
of the new CEO. 
 
When earnings decreased, the frequency of graphs in the year of the change to a new CEO (t) 
increased from 9 in the prior year to 12, while in the first full year of the new CEO (t+1) it 
declined from 12 to 10. This is also consistent with the hypothesis that poor results are 
emphasised in the year of the change to the new CEO and poor results are de-emphasised in 
the first full year of the new CEO. 
 
4.1.2 Turnover 
 
Turnover data was inconclusive when turnover increased in the year of the change to the new 
CEO, but it was supportive of the hypothesis in the first full year of the new CEO. When 
turnover declined the hypothesis was supported in the year of the change to a new CEO, but 
the data is inconsistent with the hypothesis in the first full year of the new CEO. 
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4.1.3 Earnings per Share 
 
All the frequency data for earnings per share was contrary to the hypothesis. 
 
4.1.4 Dividends per Share 
 
When dividends per share increased, the data for both periods were inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
When there was a decline in dividends per share, the data supported the hypothesis for the year of the 
change to the new CEO (year t), but it was neutral with respect to the first full year of the new CEO 
(year t+1).  
 
4.2 Distortion 
 
Table 4 provides the frequency details for distortion in graphs when the KFVs increase for 
the years (t+1) and (t). The results reveal that when the KFVs increase, the earnings and 
turnover graphs were more likely to display exaggeration in the first full year of the new CEO 
compared to the year of the change to a new CEO.  The results also reveal that when the 
KFVs increased, earnings, turnover and dividends per share had more graphs depicting 
understatement in the years of change compared to the first full years of the new CEO. When 
all KFVs were considered in total, it was observed that when the KFVs increased, the 
percentage of graphs exaggerating the KFVs in the first full year of the new CEO (t+1) was 
much higher (76%) than the percentage (61%) in the year of the change to a new CEO (t). 
 
Table 5 provides the frequency details of distortion in graphs when the KFVs decreased. 
When the KFVs decreased, only earnings had fewer understatement of graphs in the first full 
year of new CEO (t+1) compared to the year of change to the new CEO (t).  
 
However, when there was a decrease in KFVs, more graphs were exaggerated (52%) in the 
year of change to the new CEO than in the first full year of the new CEO of 48%. However, a 
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marginally greater percentage was understated in the year t+1 (45%) than the 44% in the year 
of the change to the CEO. 
 
Table 4: Frequency of Graphs Displaying the Distortion of Key Financial Variables when the 
Key Financial Variables Increase 
 
  
Year of the Change to the 
New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of the New 
CEO (t+1) 
 
The Key 
Variables Exaggerated Understated 
 
None Exaggerated Understated 
 
None 
 
Earnings 10 7 
 
0 19 4 
 
2 
 
Turnover 9 6 
 
0 16 3 
 
0 
 
Earnings per 
Share 9 2 
 
 
0 2 2 
 
 
0 
 
Dividends per 
Share 5 5 
 
 
1 7 3 
 
 
0 
 
Total 33 20 
 
1 44 12 
 
2 
 
Percentage 61% 37% 
 
2% 76% 21% 
 
3% 
 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the proportion of graphs exhibiting positive and negative distortion 
conditional on whether the underlying key financial variables increased or decreased.  
 
When the KFVs increased, in (t+1), the exaggeration, measured by positive GDI was higher 
(83%, 83% and 70% respectively for earnings, turnover and dividends per share) compared 
with the year of the change to the new CEO (59%, 60% and 50% respectively). When 
  
23 
 
 
turnover decreased, the year of the change to a new CEO had a greater proportion of 
exaggeration (67% positive GDI) than the full first year of the new CEO (44% positive GDI) 
 
Table 5: Frequency of Graphs Displaying the Distortion of Key Financial Variables when the 
Key Financial Variables Decrease 
 
  
Year of the Change to the 
New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of the New 
CEO (t+1) 
 
The Key 
Variables Exaggerated Understated 
 
None Exaggerated Understated 
 
None 
 
Earnings 6 5 
 
1 5 4 
 
1 
 
Turnover 4 2 
 
0 4 5 
 
0 
 
Earnings per 
Share 1 2 
 
 
0 4 4 
 
 
1 
 
Dividends per 
Share 2 1 
 
 
0 2 1 
 
 
0 
 
Total 13 11 
 
1 15 14 
 
2 
Percentage 52% 44% 
 
4% 48% 45% 
 
7% 
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Table 6: Proportion of Graphs Exhibiting Positive or Negative GDI for Earnings and 
Turnover 
 
Panel A: 
Earnings 
Year of the Change to 
the New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of the 
New CEO (t+1) 
 
  
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
 
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Consistent 
with 
hypothesis? 
 
Earnings 
Increase 59% 41% 
 
83% 21% 
 
 
Yes 
 
Earnings 
Decrease 55% 45% 
 
56% 44% 
 
 
No 
     
Panel B: 
Turnover 
Year of the Change to 
the New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of the 
New CEO (t+1) 
 
  
 
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Consistent 
with 
hypothesis? 
 
Turnover 
Increase 
 
60% 40% 83% 27% 
 
 
Yes 
Turnover 
Decrease 
 
67% 33% 44% 56% 
 
 
Yes 
 
  
25 
 
 
 
Table 7: Proportion of Graphs Exhibiting Positive or Negative GDI for Earnings per Share 
and Dividends per Share 
 
Panel A: 
Earnings per 
share 
Year of the Change to 
the New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of 
the New CEO 
(t+1) 
 
  
 Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Consistent with 
hypothesis? 
Earnings per 
Share  Increase 
 
82% 18% 50% 50% 
 
 
No 
 
Earnings per 
Share Decrease 
 
33% 67% 50% 50% 
 
 
 
Yes 
     
Panel B: 
Dividends per 
Share 
Year of the Change to 
the New CEO (t) 
 First Full Year of 
the New CEO 
(t+1) 
 
  
 Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Positive 
GDI 
Negative 
GDI 
Consistent with 
hypothesis? 
Dividends per 
Share Increase 
 
50% 50% 70% 30% 
 
 
Yes 
 
Dividends per 
share Decrease 
 
67% 33% 67% 33% 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Additional analysis for distortion is provided in Table 8. It provides the mean graph 
discrepancy index (GDI) for the changes in the KFVs for the first full year of the new CEO 
and the year of the change to the new CEO. 
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Table 8: Mean Graph Discrepancy Index for each of the Key Financial Variables for each of 
the Periods 
 
Mean Graph Discrepancy 
Index (GDI) 
Year of the Change 
to the New CEO (t) 
First Full Year of 
the New CEO 
(t+1) 
Consistent with  
Hypothesis? 
Earnings Increase 27.36 128.36 
 
Yes 
 
Earnings Decrease -5.66 -52.42 
 
Yes 
 
Turnover Increase 115.1 59.69 
 
Yes 
 
Turnover decrease 53.69 -91.62 
 
Yes 
 
Earnings per Share Increase -23.01 5.1 
 
Yes 
 
Earnings per Share Decrease -9.39 -31 
 
Yes 
 
Dividends per share Increase 3.13 88.41 
 
Yes 
 
Dividends per share Decrease -14.86 5.08 
 
No 
 
 
The results show that when earnings increased, the mean GDI in t+1 was 128.36 compared to 
27.36 in the year of the change to the new CEO. This is consistent with exaggerating earnings 
in the first full year of a new CEO compared to the year of the change in CEO. On the other 
hand when earnings decreased, the GDI in t+1 was -52.42 compared to -5.66 in the year of 
the change to the new CEO. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the new CEO 
understates the bad earnings news graphically in his/her first full year relative to the year of 
change. 
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When turnover decreased, there was an understatement (mean GDI = -91.62) in the first full 
year of the new CEO and an exaggeration (mean GDI = 53.69) in the year of change to the 
new CEO.  This is consistent with the hypothesis. However when turnover increased, the 
mean GDI in the first full year of the new CEO  was 59.69 which suggests exaggeration but it 
was lower compared with a GDI of 115.1 in the year of change to the new CEO. So the 
hypothesis is not supported.  
 
When earnings per share increased, there was an exaggeration (mean GDI = 5.1) in year t+1 
while there was an understatement (mean GDI = -23.01) in year t. When earnings per share 
decreased, there was an understatement (mean GDI = -31) in the first full year of the new 
CEO (t+1). These results are consistent with the hypothesis. 
  
For dividends per share, the results are mixed. When there was an increase, the mean GDI 
was 88.41 in  year t+1 suggesting exaggeration for the first full year of the new CEO and 
consistent with the hypothesis. However in the year of change to the new CEO, the GDI was 
3.13 which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. The results of GDI when dividends per share 
decreased are inconsistent with the hypothesis since in year t  the GDI was negative while in 
the year t+1 it was positive.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 provide more descriptive statistics for each of the KFVs for the year of 
change to the new CEO and the new CEO’s first full year. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings and Turnover 
 
 
N Mean GDI 
Standard. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Earnings in year t, Increase 
 
17 
 
27.3641 
 
103.31250 
 
-83.46 
 
399.35 
 
Earnings in year t+1, Increase 
 
25 
 
128.3612 
 
420.05566 
 
-133.38 
 
2005.26 
 
Earnings in year t, Decrease 
 
12 
 
-5.6575 
 
72.94821 
 
-207.79 
 
116.67 
 
Earnings in year t+1, Decrease 
 
9 
- 
52.42 
 
138.03663 
 
-358.14 
 
36.59 
 
Turnover in year t, Increase 
 
15 
 
115.0700 
 
360.72668 
 
-39.79 
 
1408.77 
 
Turnover in t+1, Increase 
 
19 
 
59.6884 
 
98.45716 
 
-16.24 
 
351.80 
 
Turnover in t, Decrease 
 
6 
 
53.6883 
 
135.47555 
 
-89.87 
 
305.26 
 
Turnover in t+1, Decrease 
 
9 
 
-91.6178 
 
225.03720 
 
-671.43 
 
40.63 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings per Share and Dividends per Share 
 
 
N Mean GDI 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Earnings per share in t, Increase 
 
11 
 
-23.0109 
 
204.01500 
 
-622.88 
 
110.66 
 
Earnings per share in t+1, Increase 
 
4 
 
5.0950 
 
93.69983 
 
-89.64 
 
125.47 
 
Earnings per share in t, Decrease 
 
3 
 
-9.3900 
 
11.71248 
 
-21.97 
 
1.20 
 
Earnings per share in t+1, Decrease 
 
9 
 
-31.0067 
 
63.23287 
 
-168.59 
 
23.20 
 
Dividends per share in t, Increase 
 
11 
 
3.1318 
 
11.83320 
 
-13.04 
 
29.87 
 
Dividends per share in t+1, Increase 
 
10 
 
88.4110 
 
245.44434 
 
-45.50 
 
776.32 
 
Dividends per share in t, Decrease 
 
3 
 
-14.8600 
 
44.11203 
 
-65.71 
 
13.13 
 
Dividends per share in t+1, 
Decrease 
 
 
3 
 
 
5.0800 
 
 
10.39795 
 
 
-3.43 
 
 
16.67 
 
 
4.3 Discussion of Results  
 
4.3.1 Selectivity 
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When firms have CEO changes, the incoming CEOs were predicted to have incentives to 
highlight poor performance by the previous management by showing graphs of poor results 
while dropping graphs that show good results. Hence, when the key financial variables 
increase, it was hypothesised that there would be fewer graphs in the year of change to the 
new CEO than the prior year. Alternatively when the key financial variables decrease, the 
year of change to the new CEO (t) should have more graphs than the prior year. The results 
supported the hypothesis for the key financial variables of “earnings”, “turnover” and 
“dividends”.  KFVs also cumulatively supported Hypothesis 1a where the number of graphs 
in the year of the change to a new CEO (24 graphs) is higher than the number of graphs in the 
prior year. 
  
It was hypothesised (Hypothesis 2a) that when the key financial variables increase, the first 
full year of the new CEO should have more graphs than in the year of the change to a new 
CEO. The results for earnings and turnover are consistent with the hypothesis because the 
number of graphs for earnings and turnover are higher in year t+1 (25 and 19 respectively) 
compared to year t (17 and 15 respectively). Alternatively, when there was a decrease in 
KFVs (poor results), the number of graphs in t+1 should be less than the number of graphs in 
year t. The results for earnings are consistent with this hypothesis since when there was a 
decrease in earnings, the number of graphs in the first full year of the new CEO (t+1) is less 
(10 graphs) compared to the year of the change to a new CEO (12 graphs).  
 
The selectivity results reveal that earnings and turnover were dominant in supporting the 
impression management hypothesis. This result is consistent with the results of Beattie and 
Jones (2000) study.  
4.3.2 Distortion 
 
In the year of the change to a new CEO, it was hypothesised (Hypothesis 1b) that the key 
financial variables would be graphically distorted to give an unfavourable portrayal of a 
firm’s performance. Hence when there was an increase in the KFVs (good results), graphs 
were expected to be distorted by understating performance as measured by negative GDI. 
Earnings per share was the only variable that was consistent with Hypothesis 1b. When there 
was a decrease in KFVs, graphs were expected to be distorted by exaggerating poor 
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performance as measured by positive GDI. Turnover was the only variable that had a positive 
GDI in the year of change to a new CEO. Hence the support for the hypothesis is weak. 
 
It was also hypothesised that in the first full year of the new CEO, key financial variables 
would be graphically distorted to give a favourable portrayal of the firm’s performance 
(Hypothesis 2b). As such when there was an increase in the key financial variable, graphical 
performance should be exaggerated as measured by a positive GDI. In the first full year of 
the new CEO all KFVs showed positive GDI when the key financial variables increased. 
These results support the hypothesis that there is exaggeration of KFVs when the KFVs 
increase.  The hypothesis also suggested that when there was a decrease in the KFVs, the new 
CEO would understate them in year t+1, as measured by negative GDI. Earnings, turnover 
and earnings per share display negative GDI providing further support for Hypothesis 2b. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary & Implications  
 
This study focussed on whether new management uses impression management to influence 
the presentation of performance in the firm’s annual reports surrounding a changeover in 
CEO. The study considered the use or non-use of graphs for presenting information as well as 
distortions in the graphs. 
 
Only the presentation of graphs for earnings was consistent with the existence of impression 
management using selectivity. The graphs for the other variables examined were not. 
Distortion in turnover graphs was consistent with impression management, both when 
turnover increased and decreased. However the results for earnings and earnings per share 
were consistent with the impression management only when they declined. In all cases the 
small size of the sample precluded tests for statistical significance. 
 
Hence overall there is some evidence for impression management, but it is not strong. Thus 
impression management as implemented through graphs does not appear to be used as widely 
in New Zealand as in other jurisdictions where it has been studied.  
5.2 Limitations 
 
The primary limitation in this study is the sample size. The sample size, however, was 
consistent with the size of the securities market in New Zealand. However the sample was not 
large enough to produce results that could be subjected to statistical analysis. Also in all cases 
even the individual KFVs data size was too small to test for statistical significance of the 
results.  
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